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EXHUMING THE “DIVERSITY EXPLANATION” OF THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.*
“The [Eleventh] [A]mendment has its full effect, if the constitution be
construed as it would have been construed, had the jurisdiction of the
Court never been extended to suits brought against a State, by the
citizens of another State, or by aliens.”1
“[T]he diversity explanation
has . . . ceased to matter.”2

of

the

Eleventh

Amendment

***
This Symposium rightly celebrates the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
publication of then-Professor William Fletcher’s illuminating article, The
Structure of Standing.3 By coincidence, this year also marks three decades
since Willy published the first of his outstanding works on what is known
as the “diversity explanation”4 or “diversity interpretation” of the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution.5 That reading would treat
*
Elvin R. Latty Professor of Law Emeritus, Duke University School of Law. Disclosure: This
Symposium’s honoree, Ninth Circuit Judge William A. (“Willy”) Fletcher, is my brother-in-law and
long-time friend. But when he was a UC-Berkeley law professor I held his scholarship in the highest
regard years before I met, fell in love with, and married his sister, Susan Fletcher French (in a ceremony
at which Judge Willy officiated). Thanks to Judge Fletcher, Professors David Shapiro and Jim Pfander,
and to participants in the conference at which the papers in this Symposium were presented for helpful
comments on earlier drafts. Remaining errors are, of course, mine.
1.
Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857–58 (1824) (Marshall, C.J., dictum).
2.
William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
843, 857 (2000).
3.
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1998).
4.
William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983) [hereinafter Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation]. See also William A.
Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1261 (1989) [hereinafter Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation]; William A. Fletcher, Exchange on the
Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 131 (1990); Fletcher, supra note 2. For an article closely
contemporaneous with Prof. Fletcher’s initial diversity-explanation piece that develops a strongly
similar view, see John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983).
5.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
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the Amendment as having everything to do with federal courts’
constitutional jurisdiction6 and nothing to do with states’ sovereign
immunity from suit7—a view that is often contrary, at least in the latter
respect, to over a century of (arguably misguided) Supreme Court
precedent.
***
The organizers of this Symposium have graciously let me write about
the aspect of Willy’s work that I said I wanted to write about, rather than
what their call asked invitees to address. I begin with the proposition that,
in my view, no fully literal interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is
practically conceivable; I have long told my Federal Courts students that
trying to proceed from the text of the Amendment (in other contexts,
usually not a bad starting point), particularly given the directions taken by
the Supreme Court for over a century now, will be a major impediment to
understanding the law that has developed in the Amendment’s judicial
interpretations. For one thing, full literalism could require that exclusion
from the “Judicial power” of “any suit in law or equity”8 properly
commenced in a state court by a citizen of another state, or an alien, against
a state but involving a federal-law matter, not be subject to review in the
Supreme Court of the United States, no matter what the nature or
importance of the point of federal law involved in the case as decided in
state court, or differences of view in courts addressing the federal-law
issue. The “Judicial power of the United States,” after all, has to do with
both original and appellate jurisdiction of the United States courts.
Anything that is outside the “Judicial power” cannot come before the
federal courts, whether as a matter of the district courts’ original
jurisdiction, or the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction,9 or for that
matter the Court’s limited original jurisdiction.
6.
See, e.g., Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 857–58 (Amendment has “full effect” with respect to
federal jurisdiction alone). To what types of jurisdiction—citizenship-based other-state citizen v. state
and alien v. state only, or other bases of jurisdiction as well including that over federal-law claims by
such plaintiffs—is a question not addressed in Chief Justice Marshall’s statement. But, in modern
application, the statement would have the Eleventh Amendment applying to jurisdiction solely
(however broadly) and not at all to states’ sovereign immunity.
7.
See Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation, supra note 4, at 1298 (On the question “whether the
states were intended to have sovereign immunity from suits brought by private individuals under federal
law,” the diversity explanation “tells us that the answer cannot be found in the Eleventh Amendment at
all.”).
8.
U.S. CONST. amend XI.
9.
Cf. Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, The Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign
Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 32–39 (1988) (discussing problems with finding federal appellate
jurisdiction over citizen-state suits from state courts under prevailing interpretations of the Eleventh
Amendment).
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Such a reading of the Eleventh Amendment strikes me as technically,
but not practically, conceivable. We aren’t going to say that the Supreme
Court has no power to review possibly erroneous state-court decisions on
federal constitutional or statutory law just because the case was in law or
equity and was brought by a private party who isn’t a citizen of the same
state10—and we haven’t.11 For the lower federal courts, literal exclusion of
“any suit in law or equity”12 brought against a state by citizens of other
states or aliens would also mean no possibility of original jurisdiction,
whatever the basis (other than admiralty, which the Amendment’s text does
not mention) on which such jurisdiction might rest—diversity between the
private plaintiff and the state, or a complaint raising a federal question.
(Such literalism would create the anomalous possibility of federal-question
jurisdiction over suits against a state by its own citizens, while excluding
suits presenting the same claim by citizens of other states or aliens.)
Advocates of the diversity explanation, it seems to me, must confess that
they read “any suit” in the text of the Amendment to have less than its full
apparent, or at least possible, textual breadth.13
But that concession does not at all mean that diversity-explanation
supporters are coming from behind; for, as we shall see,14 the leading
alternatives are far, far, gnarlier—especially for those who like their
constitutional interpretations to hew, at least more or less, as closely to the
text as makes sense. I first try to set out the diversity explanation as
concisely as I can. I then argue that its much greater cleanness in
articulation and application than leading alternatives makes a powerful case
for its being the most preferable approach, in that it sticks as closely as is
sensible to the text while providing a workable and coherent
interpretation—indeed a highly coherent one (particularly in contrast to
10.
Remember, textually the Amendment has no application to suits not in law or equity (such as
admiralty cases), nor to suits brought by citizens of the state being sued or by other governmental
entities domestic or foreign.
11.
See McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 27 (1990)
(unanimous opinion) (“We have repeatedly and without question accepted jurisdiction to review issues
of federal law arising in suits brought against States in state court.”); cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996) (“[T]his Court is empowered to review a question of federal law arising from a
state-court decision where a State has consented to suit.”).
12.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
13.
As Prof. Fletcher did. See Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation, supra note 4, at 1278–79
(acknowledging absence from Eleventh Amendment of textual limit to jurisdiction based on character
of parties). But see id. at 1276–79 (pointing to proposed but unsuccessful constitutional amendments in
1805–1807 that would have abolished most citizenship-based jurisdictions entirely, using language
identical to key parts of the Eleventh Amendment without textual limit to such jurisdictions; inferring,
from express understanding at time that these amendments would have abolished constitutional basis
for diversity-type jurisdictions but not federal-question jurisdiction, a similar understanding that
Eleventh Amendment did not eliminate constitutional basis for federal-question—or, presumably,
admiralty—suits against states by citizens of other states or aliens).
14.
See infra text accompanying notes 29–43.
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much Eleventh Amendment and state-sovereign-immunity case law on the
books). I bracket a major issue, the historical arguments over the status of
state sovereign immunity around the time of the Constitution’s framing and
ratification and, shortly afterward, the context in which the Eleventh
Amendment was adopted and its framers’ intentions. That is a huge debate,
with its ground much worked over in Supreme Court opinions15 and
academic commentary;16 I am not equipped to review the historical
research already done by others or to offer anything new to the historical
debate. I conclude with observations on whether the case for the diversity
explanation is strong enough to justify overruling the Supreme Court’s
numerous decisions on the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign
immunity, which I believe it is.
The heart of the diversity explanation is the view that the Eleventh
Amendment, in addition to leaving issues of state sovereign immunity to
other law (common, statutory, or—from non-Eleventh Amendment text or
structural principles—constitutional), applies solely to suits in law or
equity that would ground federal jurisdiction (original or appellate) on the
citizenship status—citizen of another state or an alien—of a private
plaintiff seeking to sue a state in federal court, excluding those actions, and
those alone, from the Article III judicial power. Thus “diversity,” in the
sense of a private plaintiff against a state being from elsewhere, could not
constitutionally be a basis for federal jurisdiction, as original Article III
could be read to allow17 and as the Supreme Court interpreted Article III in
the case that led to the proposal and ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment, Chisholm v. Georgia.18 The one-way focus of the Amendment
would leave states free to bring diversity-based suits in law or equity
against private defendants from elsewhere, at least—with respect to federal
trial courts’ original jurisdiction—to the extent that Congress so provided
by statute.19 That view of the Amendment, diversity theorists have
15.
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–27 (1999) (reviewing state sovereign immunity
around time of founding and history of proposal and ratification of Eleventh Amendment); id. at 762–
94 (Souter, J., dissenting) (same, reaching opposite conclusions); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 101–16 (Souter, J., dissenting).
16.
See, e.g., the Fletcher articles cited supra notes 2, 4; Gibbons, supra note 4; Jackson, supra
note 9; James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh
Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998). For leading articles taking issue in varying degrees with
the diversity explanation, see Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989); William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989); Calvin R. Massey, State
Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989).
17.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to
Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State . . . and between a State . . . and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.”).
18.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
19.
An issue that might have to be faced should the diversity explanation ever become law would
be whether, in the case of a state’s diversity-based suit in law or equity in federal court against a private
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contended, would correct Chisholm’s mistaken interpretation of Article III
as providing for either-way federal judicial power over citizenship-based
suits in law or equity involving a state as defendant as well as when it was
plaintiff.20
Notice the cleanness of interpretation produced by the diversity
explanation. For state-law suits in law or equity by private parties against
states (such as those relying on state contract law to collect on state debts),
with the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment as read by the diversity
explanation, all such suits are outside the federal judicial power: those by
same-state plaintiffs because there is no diversity (and no other basis for
federal jurisdiction), and those by other-state plaintiffs or aliens because the
Eleventh Amendment excludes their actions. For federal-law suits in law or
equity, the citizenship status of a private party is irrelevant to federal
constitutional jurisdiction—the Eleventh Amendment not applying—and
can be similarly irrelevant to federal statutory jurisdiction to the extent that
Congress chooses to make it so. No anomalies: same-state, other-state, and
alien plaintiffs against state defendants suing in law or equity are either all
constitutionally out (when diversity would provide the only basis of
jurisdiction)21 or all constitutionally in (when the case comes within
federal-question jurisdiction, however Congress chooses to define it
statutorily for the federal trial courts).22
Is it really all that simple? I think so,23 in basic outline. So where does
that leave state sovereign immunity, a major concern in Eleventh
Amendment and related cases for over a century? The diversity explanation
leaves state sovereign immunity from suit to other sources of law, first in
state-law cases (in state or federal court) to states’ own common, statutory,
diverse or alien party (an unlikely choice for a state to make even if a federal statute authorized it?), the
private defendant could add a counterclaim that the Eleventh Amendment would have excluded from
the federal judicial power if the private party had tried to initiate the same claim in federal court.
Suppress any temptation to deal with the problem by finding waiver from the state’s having chosen to
sue in federal court; if the Eleventh Amendment is all about the Article III judicial power and not in any
respect about state sovereign immunity, the usual rule that parties cannot waive restrictions on federal
subject-matter jurisdiction, see infra note 38, would govern. The Amendment’s ban on suits
“commenced” against a state would not apply, but there could be room for debate about whether the
counterclaim fell within the text’s “or prosecuted” bar.
20.
See Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation, supra note 4, at 1035 (suggesting that the Eleventh
Amendment “was intended to require that the state-citizen diversity clause of article III be construed to
confer federal jurisdiction only over disputes in which the state was a plaintiff”).
21.
See Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation, supra note 4, at 1291 (stating that under the diversity
explanation, “out-of-staters, foreigners, and in-staters are treated identically: there is no party-based
jurisdiction for any of them.”).
22.
See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 383 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[A] case
arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, is cognisable in the courts of the Union,
whoever may be the parties to that case.”). The same, incidentally, would hold for admiralty cases,
whatever their sometimes-ambiguous jurisdictional status.
23.
Prof. Fletcher did as well. See Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation, supra note 4, at 1035
(describing his proposed interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as “strikingly simple”).
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or constitutional law. In federal-law cases, the explanation does not abolish
state sovereign immunity, but rather unpins it from the Eleventh
Amendment. So states need not hasten—were the Supreme Court to
embrace the diversity explanation—to seek constitutional overruling of that
interpretation, should they be alarmed by the prospect of liability they have
gotten used to not having, at least in principle, to worry about.24 Federal
courts on their own can recognize state immunities in federal-law cases as a
matter of federal common law.25 Whatever the federal courts (and state
courts in federal-law cases, federal common law applying there as well26)
decide about state sovereign immunity as a matter of federal common law,
Congress can fortify or weaken.27 And the Supreme Court has shown that it
can constitutionalize state sovereign immunity as well, should it be so
minded.28

24.
The “at least in principle” qualifier reflects that personal damage liability of state officials
sued in their individual capacity, combined with widespread governmental indemnity for such officials
actually held liable, means that the states’ theoretical immunity from suit frequently does not keep them
from being the ultimate source of a damage recovery. See John C. Jeffries Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh
Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 49–50 (1998) (Given the suability of state officers
and state-government indemnity for state officials held personally liable, the Eleventh Amendment
“almost never matters.”). So any reduction in formal state immunity could often result in a more direct
payment than under present law but not in actual drains on state treasuries that states do not now pay in
any way. And as Judge Fletcher has added, local governments, which generally do not enjoy states’
Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity but do have some judicially recognized defenses to
damage suits that would presumably be available to suable states as well, do not seem to have been
“unreasonably burdened under the current regime.” Fletcher, supra note 2, at 851.
Moreover, under present law, states and state officials sued in their official capacity are not “persons”
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), a principal vehicle for bringing suits for alleged state
and local violations of federal rights. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). The
Eleventh Amendment was not directly at issue in Will because the suit was brought in state court, but
concern for Eleventh Amendment immunity influenced the majority’s interpretation of the federal
statute. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66–67 (“[I]n deciphering congressional intent as to the scope of § 1983,
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment is a consideration . . . .”). Will was a 5-4 decision, however, and a
Supreme Court majority prepared to embrace the diversity explanation of the Eleventh Amendment
might also take a different view of Will’s interpretation of § 1983.
25.
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (speaking of
state sovereign immunity in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), as a “common-law presumption,”
which “Congress had not, by legislation, attempted to overcome”); id. at 124 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(viewing the suit by an in-state private plaintiff in Hans as “barred by a nonconstitutional common-law
immunity”). See generally 17A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 123.05[3]
(3d ed. 2013) (discussing the theory of the Eleventh Amendment as restoring states’ common-law
sovereign immunity).
26.
See MOORE ET AL., supra note 25, § 124.40[1], at 124-119 (“The Supremacy Clause makes
federal common law binding on both state and federal courts.”).
27.
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (speaking of Congress’s
authority to grant unconsenting “States a sovereign immunity defense,” at least in some types of cases);
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981) (“[W]hen Congress addresses a question
previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise
of lawmaking by federal courts disappears.”).
28.
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999) (“[T]he Constitution was understood, in light
of its history and structure, to preserve the States’ traditional immunity from private suits.”).
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I have already called attention to the interpretive cleanness of the
diversity explanation of the Eleventh Amendment. Under the leading—and
currently authoritative—contrary interpretation, at least since the 1890s the
Court has viewed the Amendment as dealing not only with federal courts’
jurisdiction but also as entrenching some degree of state sovereign
immunity (or recognizing already-existent, if not textually specified,
immunity) at a minimum from suit in federal court, whatever the basis of
the claim against the state. This view has required results that depart
increasingly from the Amendment’s text. The following list summarizes
briefly the key points that the sovereign-immunity view has led the Court
to espouse and how they differ from the text or require legal fictions. As I
have said many times to my Federal Courts students, welcome to the puzzle
palace!
1) Despite the omission of plaintiff citizens of a defendant
state from the text of the Eleventh Amendment, state
sovereign immunity extends to suits by them as well as
those by citizens of other states and citizens or subjects of
foreign nations.29
2) To ensure the enforceability of federal law, suits for
prospective injunctive or declaratory relief against state
officials (which, when successful, effectively keep the state
from acting) are generally not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment,30 which requires the fictive contortion that the
official’s challenged action is not action by the “state” for
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment (the allegedly
unlawful action being “ultra vires”) but is state action for
purposes of applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment and
other federal-law restraints on states’ policies and their
officials’ conduct.31

29.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Whatever the extent to which the Court’s decision may
ultimately have rested on federal common law of state sovereign immunity, see supra note 25, the Hans
opinion rejected with an incredulous rhetorical question the possibility that the Eleventh Amendment
left it open for citizens to sue their own state in federal court: “Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh
Amendment was adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state
in the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was
indignantly repelled?” Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
30.
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
31.
Fletcher, supra note 2, at 849 (“[A] state officer sued for prospective (i.e., injunctive) relief
under federal law is not part of the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, even though the
rationale for the suit is that the officer’s behavior was state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.”);
see also Young, 209 U.S. at 181–82 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[A]n order by the Federal court which
prevents the State from being represented in its own courts, by its chief law officer, upon an issue
involving the constitutional validity of certain state enactments” must be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment “unless a suit against the Attorney General of a State, in his official capacity, is not one
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3) Despite the textual reference to “any suit in law or
equity,”32 private admiralty actions against states are barred
as well.33
4) Even though the Amendment’s text limits solely some
private parties as plaintiffs against states (and Article III,
Section Two, Clause One, uncontradicted by the Eleventh
Amendment’s text, extends the federal judicial power to
“Controversies . . . between a State . . . and foreign
States”34), suits by foreign countries against states are also
barred.35
5) Despite the judicial-power language in the Amendment and
the strong rule that party consent cannot override limits on
federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction,36 states may
under certain conditions consent to be sued in federal court
or be held to have waived their sovereign immunity,37
making the Amendment a hybrid that somewhat waters
down usual jurisdictional approaches38 (although a state can
against a State under the Eleventh Amendment when its determination depends upon a question of
constitutional power or right under the Fourteenth Amendment. In that view I cannot concur.”).
32.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
33.
Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490 (1921). The opinion referred to state immunity from
suit as “a fundamental rule of jurisprudence . . . of which the Amendment is but an exemplification,” id.
at 497, but the Court has since cited it, like Hans, as an Eleventh Amendment case. See Fla. Dep’t of
State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 683 n.17 (1982):
Although the [Eleventh] Amendment does not literally apply to actions brought against a
State by its own citizens, the Amendment long has been held to govern such actions. Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 . . . . Nor does the Amendment literally apply to proceedings in
admiralty. Again, however, the Court has found it to govern certain admiralty actions. See In
re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500.
34.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
35.
See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321 (1934):
[N]either the literal sweep of the words of Clause one of § 2 of Article III, nor the absence of
restriction in the letter of the Eleventh Amendment, permits the conclusion that in all
controversies of the sort described in Clause one, and omitted from the words of the
Eleventh Amendment, a State may be sued without her consent.
36.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
37.
See, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (stating that
at least in some circumstances, a state’s removal of a case from state to federal court waives its
sovereign immunity from suit there); Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906):
Although a state may not be sued without its consent, such immunity is a privilege which
may be waived, and hence where a state voluntarily becomes a party to a cause and submits
its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot escape the result of
its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the [Eleventh] Amendment.
38.
See Pfander, supra note 16, at 1373–74 (internal footnotes omitted):
Of the many debatable features of the Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence,
perhaps none can match the curious notion that suits against the states, though nominally
placed beyond the “judicial power” of the federal courts, may nonetheless be brought back
within that power by the state’s consent to suit. Classical jurisdictional doctrine views the
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sometimes raise its sovereign-immunity objection, like a
jurisdictional objection, on appeal after losing at trial39).
6) While Congress cannot give the federal courts subjectmatter jurisdiction over cases not within the Article III
judicial power,40 it may in some situations abrogate state
sovereign immunity and permit suits in federal court that
the Eleventh Amendment would otherwise bar;41
7) Despite the judicial-power language in the Amendment, it
does not bar appeals in other-state-citizen-v.-state cases or
alien-v.-state cases, at least those involving federal-law
matters, from state courts to the Supreme Court.42
8) Even though federal administrative tribunals, not being
Article III courts, do not exercise the Article III “judicial
Power” of the United States that the Eleventh Amendment
restricts, states’ sovereign immunity extends to private
parties’ proceedings before such tribunals as well.43
The extent to which these decisions sail against strong textual wind,
require indulging in legal fiction, and involve departures from strong and
widely followed jurisdictional rules justifies a nice remark by a bemused
federal trial judge: “Doctrines, like people, are sometimes excused from the
requirement of logical consistency when they are [several decades] old.”44
The many contortions also highlight the simplicity and coherence of the
diversity explanation; the contrast makes part of a strong case for the
diversity interpretation as adhering more closely than the alternatives to

federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction, with power to hear cases and controversies
that affirmatively come within the defined limits of Article III, but without power to hear
matters that extend beyond the scope of that grant. This strong rule against the expansion of
federal judicial authority ordinarily applies even where the parties “consent” to the federal
courts’ jurisdiction.
39.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment defense
sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial
court . . . .”).
40.
See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809) (A “statute cannot
extend the jurisdiction [of the federal courts] beyond the limits of the constitution.”).
41.
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (approving abrogation as exercise of
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57–73
(1996) (largely limiting abrogation to exercises of Congressional power under the Fourteenth, and
perhaps some other post-Eleventh Amendment, constitutional provisions); Va. Office for Prot. &
Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638 n.2 (2011) (“We have recognized that Congress may
abrogate a State’s immunity when it acts under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not when it acts
under its original Article I authority to regulate commerce.”) (citations omitted).
42.
See supra note 11 and text accompanying notes 10–11.
43.
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 754 (2002) (“[T]he sovereign
immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment.”).
44.
Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 687 F. Supp. 1380, 1384 (D. Alaska 1988).
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canons of “strict construction”45 and to what the framers of the Eleventh
Amendment must have had in mind.46 The nature of the ideological splits
in many of the recent decisions and the departures from text to protect
states’ sovereign immunity also make irresistible the temptation to point to
this area as a prime illustration of conservative judicial activism.
Each of the foregoing eight items could be the jumping-off point for an
explanation at some length, but such depth does not seem necessary for the
purposes of this essay. For now, what seems important is to note that the
Court has sometimes spoken as if it were interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment47 (however much it was departing from its text) and has at
other times spoken in terms of background postulates48 and structural
principles.49 The Court, speaking as has often been the case lately through a
five-Justice majority with four persistent dissenters, largely resolved that
tension in a case forced by the path down which it had been proceeding:
with states often immune from suit in federal court and Congress limited in
its ability to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity, the next logical
step was for plaintiffs to try enforcing federal-law rights against states in
state courts. Not even the previous textual contortions seemed to make
anyone feel that the Amendment could be extended to suits in state court,
so the choice was stark: allow federal-law suits that could not be brought in
federal court against unconsenting states to be brought in state court, or
hold that state sovereign immunity not grounded in the Amendment (nor
found elsewhere in the text of the federal Constitution50) barred such suits
as well as those in federal court.
Two state supreme courts had taken opposing views on this question,51
and the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5–4 decision split along familiar lines

45.
Gibbons, supra note 4, at 2004.
46.
Again, I am not trying to reopen the historical aspect of the debate over the diversity
explanation, but its proponents also make a strong—if controverted—argument that the diversity view
also fits much better than the alternatives with the historical evidence of the framers’ intent. See, e.g.,
supra sources cited in note 16.
47.
See, e.g., supra note 33.
48.
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1934) (footnote omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted):
Behind the words of the constitutional provisions [of Article III and the Eleventh
Amendment] are postulates which limit and control. . . . There is . . . the postulate that States
of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without
their consent, save where there has been a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the
convention.
49.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999) (“[S]overeign immunity derives not from the
Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution itself.”).
50.
See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 16, at 1279 n.42. (“[T]he Constitution never mentions the word
‘sovereign’ and does not by its terms confer immunity on any government body.”).
51.
Compare Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998) (upholding dismissal on ground of state
sovereign immunity), aff’d. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), with Jacoby v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ.,
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resoundingly resolved it in favor of extratextual but constitutional state
sovereign immunity in Alden v. Maine.52 It is that decision that led Judge
Fletcher in his 2000 article to state that “the diversity explanation of the
Eleventh Amendment has finally ceased to matter.”53 That observation is
accurate in the sense that the diversity explanation was offering a limited,
jurisdiction-focused
alternative
to
expansive,
immunity-tinged
interpretations of the Amendment. But as long as the Supreme Court
conclusively grounds state sovereign immunity in structure and background
postulates rather than the Eleventh Amendment’s text,54 unconsenting
states’ immunity holds no matter how one reads the Amendment.
So should I end my exhumation with a quick reburial, acknowledging
that both the Supreme Court majority and the leading exponent of the
diversity explanation have made it, or concluded that it is, kaput? I’m not
inclined to give up so easily. First, the diversity explanation has often
recently commanded and predicted four Supreme Court Justices’ votes.55
While two of the most recent four (Justices Stevens and Souter) have left
the Court, and their two successors have not expressed views of their own
on the Amendment,56 it is hardly unlikely that new Justices Sotomayor and

962 S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1998) (rejecting defense of state sovereign immunity from federal-law claim in
state court), vacated, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999).
52.
527 U.S. 706, 733 (1999) (“[T]he structure and history of the Constitution make clear that
[states’ sovereign] immunity exists today by constitutional design.”). Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion
of the Court, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.
Justice Souter’s dissent was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
53.
Fletcher, supra note 2, at 857.
54.
Id. at 858 (“[T]he present Court has finally cleared away the text of the Eleventh
Amendment.”).
55.
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
JJ.) (viewing Eleventh Amendment’s “limited codification” as “dealing solely with federal citizen-state
diversity jurisdiction”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 110 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting,
joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.) (“The history and structure of the Eleventh Amendment
convincingly show that it reaches only to suits subject to federal jurisdiction exclusively under the
Citizen-State Diversity Clauses.”). The failure to mention alien-v.-state diversity cases was presumably
an oversight.
56.
The Court has decided only two Eleventh Amendment/state-sovereign-immunity cases since
four new Justices joined the Court (with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, and
Kagan having succeeded to the seats of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Souter, and
Stevens respectively). The first was Virginia Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct.
1632 (2011). Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court, joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor, upheld the applicability of the Ex parte Young exception to a case involving a
suit by a state agency against state officials. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, along with Justice
Sotomayor, joined background statements of sovereign-immunity law established in decisions from
which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer had dissented, but without any indication whether they would or
would not vote to overrule those decisions were their continuing validity to come before the Court. See
id. at 1637 (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to confirm the structural understanding
that States entered the Union with their sovereign immunity intact, unlimited by Article III’s
jurisdictional grant. Our cases hold that the States have retained their traditional immunity from suit,
except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional amendments.”) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, dissented.
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Kagan would align with diversity-explanation adherents Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer.57 Should they do so, one replacement of a Republican
appointee by a Democratic President could provide a fifth vote for the
diversity explanation. Were there such a majority, the same five Justices
might also be inclined to overrule to some extent the hard, broad
constitutionalization of state sovereign immunity by the recent majority,
opening up questions about the extent of federal immunity on federal-law
claims against states under federal common, statutory, and constitutional
law.58 Such a double overruling—reinterpreting the Eleventh Amendment
and discarding what has become the non-Eleventh Amendment
constitutionalization of state sovereign immunity—would be necessary to
attain the greatest possible positive effect from adopting the diversity
explanation.
But even short of such a twofer—both adopting the diversity
explanation and retreating from the current sweep of federal constitutional
Justice Kagan did not participate, and Justice Sotomayor did not write separately (nor did either Justice
Ginsburg or Justice Breyer).
The second case was Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012), in which the
Supreme Court without a majority opinion held that an unpaid-leave provision in the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654, was not within Congress’s power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Justices Sotomayor and
Kagan joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, joined in full by Justice Breyer, but did not join a footnote in
which she noted her continuing dissent from Seminole Tribe on Commerce Clause abrogation authority
and another case narrowly construing Section 5 abrogation authority. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1339
& n.1. I hesitate to infer, from their declining to join the footnote while joining the rest of the dissent,
any disagreement by the newest Justices with the underlying position of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
in a decision mostly involving disagreement with the rest of the Court over application of established
abrogation precedent. Coleman was not a likely vehicle for Justices Sotomayor and Kagan to weigh in
heavily on major Eleventh Amendment/state-sovereign-immunity issues.
57.
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer seem highly likely to adhere to their support of the diversity
explanation. They have dissented in every case extending state sovereign immunity since they became
members of the Supreme Court about two decades ago. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports
Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 772 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.);
Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg, JJ.); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760
(1999) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 693 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 648 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.); Idaho v.
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 297 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ.); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by
Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.). They joined Justice Souter’s express endorsements of the diversity
explanation in Seminole Tribe and Alden. See supra note 55. The Alden dissent concluded with the
prediction that “the Court’s late essay into immunity doctrine will prove the equal of its earlier
experiment in laissez-faire [in cases like Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)], the one being as
unrealistic as the other, as indefensible, and probably as fleeting.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 814 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
58.
See, e.g., Gibbons, supra note 4, at 2004 (acknowledging “room for a federal doctrine of state
sovereign immunity,” debated on “the practical policy level,” if diversity view of Eleventh Amendment
were adopted).
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state sovereign immunity from suit on federal claims—adoption of the
diversity explanation could have some positive consequences. That
explanation might still, in sum, matter even if state sovereign immunity
from suit on federal claims (excluding those by the federal government and
other states, to which it has never extended59) remained heavily
constitutionalized. Four possibilities come most prominently to mind.
First, with no bar in constitutional text to anyone’s suing a state on a
federal-law claim in federal court, the suability of a state official in federal
court for prospective relief as allowed by Ex parte Young would cease to
require what is often regarded as a fiction. If you could constitutionally
name the state as a defendant, there would be no need for fancy footwork to
find a state official suable when the state was not; it would make no
constitutional jurisdictional difference whether the plaintiff named one, the
other, or both. Both, of course, would have any immunities or defenses
recognized by federal law; but those would be the same for the state and its
officials, in contrast to the present absolute bar to naming the state coupled
with the ability to sue the official for prospective relief.60
This change could amount to more than a conceptual nicety, because
the sense that Young’s fictive nature is shaky has led to its being construed
narrowly (related state-law claims may not tag along with Young-based
federal-law claims, even though they would be within otherwise
appropriate pendent or supplemental federal jurisdiction61) and the
continued raising of questions whether it should be read narrowly in other
respects.62 Taking Young out of the realm of shaky legal fiction would thus
eliminate, or at least tamp down, one significant source of pressure for
narrow construction of state officials’ suability on federal claims for
injunctive or declaratory relief in federal court.
Second, consent and waiver would disappear from Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, eliminating a major conundrum in present
law.63 With the Amendment solely about federal judicial power, no waiver

59.
See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (“In ratifying the Constitution, the States consented to suits
brought by other States or by the Federal Government.”).
60.
See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); cf. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167
n.14 (1985) (“[O]fficial-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the
State.”).
61.
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
62.
See, e.g., Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1645 (2011) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting, joined by Alito, J.) (stating that in holding “that a state agency may sue officials acting
on behalf of the State in federal court . . . the Court extends the fiction of Ex parte Young—what we
have called an ‘empty formalism’—well beyond the circumstances of that case”); Idaho v. Coeur
d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 278 (1997) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (opinion announcing
judgment of Court) (advocating careful, case-by-case “balancing and accommodation of state interests
when determining whether the Young exception applies in a given case”).
63.
See supra note 38 and text accompanying notes 36–38.

8 ROWE 457-472 (DO NOT DELETE)

470

12/12/2013 3:02 PM

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 65:2:457

of its restriction on Article III jurisdiction would be possible.64 But
immunity law from whatever source—judge-made, statutory, or nonEleventh Amendment constitutional—could have its own waivability lore
unencumbered by tensions with judicial-power phraseology and limits.
Third, congressional abrogation issues would take a different form.
Congress cannot expand the Article III judicial power with a mere statute,65
so the constitutional limits imposed on that power by the Eleventh
Amendment would be entirely beyond Congress’s reach. But with state
sovereign immunity grounded in other sources of law, the extent to which
Congress could define or override it would depend on the immunity law’s
source and nature. To whatever extent abrogation issues are now affected
by whether the power under which Congress seeks to act predates or
postdates the Eleventh Amendment,66 any pure temporality factor would
lose its force. With the Amendment having nothing to do with state
sovereign immunity, and such immunity grounded in sources having
nothing to do with the Amendment or when it was adopted, the focus
would be on the nature of the power under which Congress sought to act
and how it related to a retained constitutional state sovereign immunity.
Perhaps disturbingly, Congress should not be able to override a heavily
constitutionalized state sovereign immunity under any power not directly or
by strong implication addressing such immunity (and I know of no Article I
power that does67)—which makes part of a case against such heavy
constitutionalization. But to whatever extent judicial articulations of
immunity law left room for any congressional action, Congress could
define, limit, and expand otherwise-defined state immunities—with any
valid use of congressional authority, with no regard to whether it got into
the Constitution before or after the decision to overrule Chisholm by
constitutional amendment.

64.
65.
66.

See supra note 38.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65–66 (1996) (internal citation omitted):
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment
and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing balance between
state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment. As the dissent
in Union Gas made clear, Fitzpatrick cannot be read to justify “limitation of the principle
embodied in the Eleventh Amendment through appeal to antecedent provisions of the
Constitution.”
67.
But cf. Cent. Va. Comty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 373 (2006) (The Article One
Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress power to hold state agencies liable in cases “ancillary to the
bankruptcy courts’ in rem jurisdiction.”); see also id. at 362–63 (“The history of the Bankruptcy Clause,
the reasons it was inserted in the Constitution, and the legislation both proposed and enacted under its
auspices immediately following ratification of the Constitution demonstrate that it was intended not just
as a grant of legislative authority to Congress, but also to authorize limited subordination of state
sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy arena.”).
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Finally, adopting the diversity explanation would banish any tension
about the constitutional scope of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
over cases from state courts.68 With the Amendment limiting the federal
judicial power solely with respect to diversity-based suits brought by otherstate citizens and aliens, appeals basing jurisdiction not on citizenship but
on the presence of a federal-law matter would without issue come within
the Court’s constitutional (and statutory69) appellate jurisdiction. And statecourt cases with no federal-law element that involve a citizen of another
state or an alien suing a state would present no basis for exercise of federal
review.
My argument thus far may make it seem that as a Supreme Court
Justice, I would unhesitatingly vote to overrule the whole line of restrictive
Eleventh Amendment/state-sovereign-immunity cases from Hans v.
Louisiana on down. Precedent does, though, deserve respect; how much
weight it should have is the key question. Professor David Shapiro wrestled
with this issue in a characteristically thoughtful and measured general
essay,70 choosing as his testing case precisely this problem. For Shapiro, a
strong critic of many of the Court’s decisions on the Eleventh Amendment
and state sovereign immunity,71 the choice whether to overrule were he the
deciding vote turned out to be a close one given his views on stare decisis,
and he concluded that he would indeed not vote to overrule.72 For him,
“[T]he mischief [that state-sovereign-immunity doctrine] is causing is too
marginal to warrant a vote to overrule. To put it another way, the doctrine
as it has evolved has so many loopholes and limitations that it seldom if
ever stands in the way of implementing federal policy or vindicating
federal rights.”73 I can add that the Court’s decisions, while often sharply
divided, have been fairly consistent over decades; and even Justice Souter,
68.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 113 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The good sense of [the] early
construction of the Amendment as affecting the diversity jurisdiction and no more has the . . . virtue of
making sense of this Court’s repeated exercise of appellate jurisdiction in federal-question suits brought
against States in their own courts by out-of-staters.”).
69.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006):
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision
could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity
of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a
statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the
Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or
immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of,
or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
70.
David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection, 86
TEX. L. REV. 929 (2008).
71.
See id. at 952 n.97 (citing his articles and briefs critical of the Court’s decisions).
72.
See id. at 947–57.
73.
Id. at 956 (citing Jeffries, supra note 24, and Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who’s Afraid of
the Eleventh Amendment? The Limited Impact of the Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 213 (2006)).
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a fierce critic of the Court’s decisions during his service, was not prepared
to overrule Hans.74
I agree that the case on overruling is at least somewhat close, although
not everyone sees it that way.75 For me, several factors would probably lead
me to vote to overrule. First, there is the strength of the historical case
made by the proponents of the diversity explanation. Second, as this essay
has described, the coherence and workability of the diversity approach
would be a vast improvement over the mare’s nest of current atextual
doctrine; and beyond general coherence and workability, there would be
the possibly significant specific consequences that my thinking for this
essay has led me to identify.76 Finally, the very point of limited mischief
that for putative Justice Shapiro counted against overruling has the flip side
that the likely effects of overruling should not be cause for alarm.77
Many years ago a fortune cookie at the end of a Chinese meal gave me
a message of a marvelous profundity rarely found in such tidbits: “No one
is exempt from talking nonsense; the misfortune is to do it solemnly.”78 I
have found more than one aspect of the Federal Courts course to which I
thought that saying might apply. But I have invoked it more regularly with
respect to the Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment law and its
jurisprudence of state sovereign immunity than for any other area of the
course. Were the Court to adopt the diversity explanation of the Eleventh
Amendment, I could retire that fortune—at least for this aspect of the
course. I hope that at some point in the time that remains to this senior
academic, I may be able to do so.

74.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 130 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I would not, as a
matter of stare decisis, overrule Hans today . . . .”).
75.
See Burt Neuborne, A Comment on Professor David L. Shapiro’s The Role of Precedent in
Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection, 86 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 51, 54 (2008), available at
http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Neuborne-86-TLRSA-51.pdf (“Unlike Justice Shapiro, I
would overrule the whole Eleventh Amendment mess in a New York minute . . . .”).
76.
See supra text accompanying notes 59–69.
77.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
78.
The saying, for which my cookie acknowledged no source, appears to be from Michel de
Montaigne. See W. GURNEY BENHAM, CASSELL’S BOOK OF QUOTATIONS, PROVERBS AND HOUSEHOLD
WORDS 727 (rev. ed. 1914).

